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Preface
Introduction
The transition undergone by Germany in the 1930s, a transition from inte gration in a world market and from an organised but free economy to a virulent form of economic nationalism and to economic control, was a com mon one in that decade, and one associated everywhere with polltical change. Many economies in East and Southern Europe and in South America ran into difficulty in the 1920s as they attempted rapid industrialisations on the inadequate base of an agriculture hit by a world crisis. In many cases credit and banking crises made the position worse. Economic troubles con solidated the military dictatorship of Pilsudski and his successors in Po land; led to the semi-fascist rule of Gombös and Imredy in Hungary; and enabled the implementation of a terror regime in King Carol 's Rumania. They undermined the more or less benign despotism of General Primo de Rivera in in and led to aseries of political upheavals. They resulted in the fall of the popular Irigoyen regime in Argentina and its replace 1 ment by the governments of Uriburu and Justu; and in the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Germany was a much more advanced industrial economy than those described; but in Germany the economic crisis too produced radical political changes and in the end pushed Hitler into power. Moreover, the new East and Southern European and South American regimes possessed similarities, at least ini tially, with the Nazi regime until 1935/6 in Germany. These depended on an authoritarian approach to political issues, and relied heavily on technical experts -finance experts, bankers -who believed that they were suppress ing "corrupt" democracies, democracies run, in most of the cases listed, by shady but populist clerical parties reliant on graft, pay-offs, and often violence, to deal with oppositions. In all these states, matters of economic policy could not be solved easily in an apolitical way, and the experts realised this. In the first place, manyentrenched interests were at stake. Secondly, economic issues involved fundamental disputes about the distribution of wealth and income in highly unstable societies. Thirdly, modern theories of economic management have, often unstated, political assumptions and prerequisites. Thus. for instance, the system of Keynesian recommendations presupposes a quite high level of political consensus and stability. Keynesian style demand management was as inappropriateto these struggling political bodies as it is to Poland or Brazi I in 1983. The highly unstable situation that preceded the German economic collapse at the end of the 1920s led Western observers to class Germany in the same league as:;tates very much less economically developed than Germany. American financiers contemplated the administration of German public finance on the lines of the pre-First World War dette ottomane, where specific tax revenues were pledged to foreign creditors, and where those pledges might be enforced, if necessary, by bayonets and gunboats. One American banker referred to the Germans as "fundamentally a second-rate people". This was the verdict of the world on the instability of Weimar Germany. What con siderations dictated the German response? The German Central Bank (the Reichsbank) provides a good case study of the mentality of the technicians of money. Its history is of double interest as it ayed a role in linking Germany to the world in the international ist 1920s and then, later, in the isolationist 1930s, in cutting Germany off 1 from the world.
On the role of central banks in creating international cooperation during the 19205, see F. Hirsch and P. Oppenheimer, 'The Trial of Managed Money' in .) C.M. Cipolla, The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. 5, Part 2 (The Twentieth Century), London, 1976, p. 619; and S.V.O. Clarke, Central Bank Cooperation 1924 -1931 , New York, 1967 . Though there has been a large and stimulating literature, produced in the main by younq German historians, on the relationsnlp between business, economic interest groups and the state in the Weimar Republic, these historians have in general ig nored the problems arising out of central banking po.icies; and, though some of them have seen the gap in their arguments, little has been done to fill it. On the new German approach, see the Bochum Conference of 1973, which served as an intellectual fountain: the proceedings were published as (eds. Krise, Wuppertal, 1978; and, most recently, R. Neebe, Grossindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930 -1933 . Paul Silverberg und der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in der Krise der Weimarer Republik, Göttingen, 1981.
The managers of the Reichsbank had to take most of their actions in an un accustorred glare of publicity: in general, the central bankers of the 1920s , Norman, Moreau, Stringher and Schacht -were rather better known figures than any of their sors. This was because everywhere in the world, the First War led to currency instabili : money and exchange rates lost their characteroforderly elements in a well-ordered world. Their new disorder affected ordinary social conduct: affected real wages, affected rentes and affected prices. Politicians knew now that people cared about economics, perhaps more than about religion or liberty; and economists and bankers had to adjust to the fact that there was now a vast audience for vulgarised economic theory. The rren In the central banks, in the finance ministries and in the banks who are the subject of this study saw themselves as technical ; but some, icularly in Germany, were aware of the general political impli cations of their actions, and aware that others were aware. For in Germany, the state breathed down the necks of economists: there had scare y been a tradition of economic thought of a Marshallian kind which viewed econorrics as an objective and autonomous science. Instead there was a long-standinq belief in the state as the supreme power in economic life (which prevailed as a belief even when it was a very poor description of Gerrran reality); this belief found its most powerful representation in G.F. Knapp's State of Money.2 The First World War, and the extension of state power during the War, gave a powerful stimulus to such doctrines. Knapp's pupils included Karl Helfferich, who hel to set up the wartime inflation, and Heinrich Brüning, the Hunger Chancellor of the Depression. Both shared with others, even with those who like Schacht talked of market mechanisrrs, in the doctrine of the subrrission the market to a plan. The currency instability of the early 1920s made the currency into a i tically contentious issue. Who was to take the blame for the dislocation of the inflation period? The majority of Germans, living from 1914 to 1923 through the most rapid inflation the world had yet seen, at first believed that their misfortune was the result of Allied demands for reparation pay ments. The government was keen to encourage this belief. Foreign observers 12 on the other hand liked to give an alternative explanation: that unfunded government budget deficits, which had only to a small extent been produced by external payments, had increased the amount of money in circulation and thus started a price rise. 3 For the years after the currency collapse, the debate continued, conducted in much the same terms. The German economy still looked unhealthy. Were the increasing foreign payments to be made under the Dawes Plan responsible? Or the expanding activity of government at the fe deral (Reich), and even more at the state (L~nder) and local (communal) levels? For four years after the end of the war, German governments had avoided a stabilisation of the currency because such a stabilisation, involving severe monetary restriction, would have led to an increase in unemployment and of the danger of successful revolution. Socially and politically, the Germans could not afford td stabilise. 4 In the hyperinflation that followed the French Ruhr occupation in January 1923, however, monetary expansion stopped having a politically stabilising effect. As unemployment increased in 1923, communist and extreme right wing disturbances increased. There were red armies in Thuringia and the Ruhr, and a brown one in Bavaria. Only then it was politically possible to stabilise: this was a very painful process, as large numbers were thrown out of work as the inflation busi nesses closed down, and as many creditors feit that they had been expro priated. The money supply rose again from its relatively low level in 1924, with only a temporary set-back in 1929, until the inning of 1930. After 3 The best exposition of the economic theories advanced to explain the in flation is in C. The interwar monetary history of Germany can then be broken up into three periods of expansion, each with very starkly contrasting political charac teristics. All three, however, were associated with attempts at political stabilisation; in the ca se of the first two, of Weimar democracy, and finally of the Third Reich. In between the ptJases of monetary expansion came eruptions ofdiscontent, which led to remodelling of the political and economic systems. The three different expansionary monetary phases provided different answers to distributional conflicts within Germany: in the first (postwar) inflation, inflation was viewed by many employers as a device for reducing real wages; in the 'suppressed inflation' of the Third Reich the state tried, with some degree of success, to peg both wages and prices. Wage control was probably more effective than price control; and both the postwar and the 1930s in flations could be regarded as profit inflations. In the second half of the 1920s, there were price and wage rises; but real wages rose while employers complained that Germany's competetive position in the world economy was being undermined. They pointed out that Germany remained structurally an export economy: though the export quota (exports as a %of GNP) fell after the war, from 17.5 % in 1910 1913 to 14.9 % in 1925-1929 , it remained si milar to Great Britain's (18.7 % and 14.8 % respectively); and in both these countries the lower 1920s figure reflected an economic weakness. 5 Secondly, the employers argued that pressure on wages was needed to increase the share of resources allocated to investment: one of the reasons given for the long-term poor performance of the interwar German economy i s tIlat there were lower investment ratios than before transition from the seeond (the late 1920s) to third (the 1930s) period of monetary expansion is eonsidered. The study involves analysis of a eom plex of issues whieh have not been dealt with in the existing voluminous literature on Weimar Germany wd its eeonomy. There is no study of monetary behaviour before the Third Reich; and though there is a great dealof analysis of German foreign poliey whieh eonsiders the role of the ReIchsbank and of economic diplomacy, the eonstitutional questions involved in the debates are not treated. Yet it will be shown that constitutional reform was essen tial to the Reichsbank's conception of its economic role. By a curious, unfortunate, but characteristic, process of historiographical division of labour, constitutional historians, who have devoted a great deal of atten tion to Reich-Länder conflicts of the Weimar Republic, have been concerned only with fiscal disputes and not with debates over qeneral matters of economic poliey (though, for instance, the Bavarian State Archives are filled with file after file on this tOPic)9; and historians of the economy rarely see the economic problem as constitutionally conditioned. During and after the BrUning period the Reich believed that its major task was to bring under its own control the refractory political machines that dominated loeal affairs. This study aims to examine the changing POIICY of the Reichsbank in the con text of these political, constitutional, and social discussions and conflicts. One of its major concerns is with the mechanisms through which institutional and policy changes are effected. Among the existing literature, the best recent account of Reichsbank policy is Gerd Hardach's10; but this stops too early (with the banking crisis of 1931) to tell satisfactori ly ttle story of the attempts of the Reichsbank to produce answers to what it diagnosed as the economic problem. Hans Luther, who in Hardach's account is a floundering politician who lacked a policy, emerges a little better from my account. An old book on the Reichs bank by Mildred Northrop11 does present a picture of an institution which had a clear vIsion of its national task; but the author was unable cause of the date, 1938, when she wrote) to use public and private papers to show how that national task was conceived. Other accounts concentrate in a biographical manner on the fascinating personality of Hjalmar Schacht. 12 There are two very revealing blow by blow diplomatic ac counts of German financial policy (by Bennett and SChuker)13; although Bennett's work suffers from its limitation to the events of 1931, a limitation which imposes a major interpretative error. It is not correct to believe with Bennett that preparations were over by the banking crisis of 1931 and that the Lausanne Conference of 1932 was a foregone conclusion after the Great Powers had agreed to a one year moratorium on political payments and a standstill on commercial ones. In my account, two stories,of domestic and foreign monetary policy, will be examined in parallel. The relationship between domestic and foreign policy has become a notorious 'problem' of German history, to which is devoted a large literature. In an analysis of the Reichsbank, this 11 M.B. Northrop, Control Policies of the Reichsbank 1924 -1933 , New New York, 1938 . 12 F. Reuter, Schacht, Leipzig, 1934 'problem' appears too: but it would not be correct to assert the primacy of either domestic or foreign considerations. Both were used functionally in an assertion of institutional identi . At first, after the ~1ark sta bilisation in 1924, the Reichsbank tried to control Germany's link to the international economy, and the bank made its own foreign policy; it tried to impose a regulation of the inflow of foreign (largely American) funds. When the lending stopped, the Reichsbank for a while continued to explore alternative sources of foreign funds, and serious endeavours were made to persuade France and the newly created Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to lend. As these attempts proved unsuccessful, the intention behind German policy changed to a cynically conceived strategy of foreign poli tical advantage; and the Reichsbank now used new methods in order to isolate parts of Germany's economy from the rest of the world. After the banking crisis of 1931, policies were employed which were more surprisinq and more controversial than those of the period 1924 to 1931. Exchange control; the quasi -moratorium (Standsti II Agreement) appl ied to foreign short-term credits; and bilateral trade agreements: these elements of the Hitler-Schacht system of 1933-1936 were initiated before Hitler became Chancellor and before Schacht returned to the Reichsbank. The Brüninq era provided a necessary stage in the building up of the instruments of control of the Nazi state. This story is thus hinged around the events of 1931: the banking and financial crisis of that year was the most dramatic event in the economic history of the interwar years in Germany, a continental equivalent to the drama of the Wall Street crash of October 1929. Banking cOllapses played a crucial role, indeed certainly more central than stock exchanqe col lapses, in making the course of the depression so severe: not only in Germany, but also throughout Central and Eastern Europe , in the USA, and in South America. 14 (V).
14 H. James, 'The Causes of the German Bankinq Crisis 1931', Economic History Review 1983, pp. 68-87.
My first chapters examine the background to 1931: the attitude and policies of the central bank (Il, the world political circumstances (lI), the cour se of government financial icy on the eve of financial catastrophe (Ili), and the views and theories of the decision makers (IV). Subsequent chapters deal with the nature of the responses to the great financial crisis: in the fields of foreign economlC relations (VI), public finance (VII), and domestic economic policy (VIII). So the theme of the work is "ßEFORE AND AFTER".
Bank deposits and Reserves
The bi-monthly bank figures for the period from February 1925 to February 1928 are taken from a variety of official publications (Sta tistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich; vlirtschaft und Statistik) and the periodical Die Bank. Balances were provided by najor German credit banks (between 89 and 83), state banks, mortgage banks and Girozentralen banks at first responsible for coordinating the policies of savings but which developed a substantial own loans business). From March 1928 German banks provided monthly balances: the calculations here are based on these monthly statements from the periodical Die Bank. Again, the larger credit banks, estate banks, mortgage banks and Giro centres reported. From March to August 1928 some of the increase in deposits and reserves is due to the increased number of banks reporting (which rose from 85 credit and mortgage banks in March to 96 in August); but since the balances for the smaller credit banks were not issued separately, it is impossible to estimate the effect of the spread of month I y reporti ng. After August 1929 such changes are of much sma 11 er importance; the reduction in the number of bank balances was due partly to fusions (as of the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1929)and in one or two cases to closure. The deposits include short-term (under seven days), medium-term (seven days to three months) and long-term (over three months) deposits: the banks made no distinction between these classes for reserve purposes, although they behave diffently. Reserves include cash, and deposits with the central bank.
Figures for 'currency in circulation' are taken from the Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich and represent the sum of Reichsbank notes, private note bank notes (comparatively small in significance), coinage and Rentenbank certificates. Before t~rch 1928 this sum is that at the end of the month, when there was a higher demand for cash; after March 1928 the figures are monthly averages, as the Statistisches Jahr buch no langer provides a guide to the sums at the end of the month (as with about all German statistics in this period, there is an element of jiggery-pokery in this change: the high demand for cash at the end of the month and the dangerously low liquidity of banks was rtly concealed by giving average figures instead. From the point vi~w of liquidity, it is exactly the month-end figures that were important: the the averages were as useful to central bank policy makers as information on the average height of a mountain range would be to a pilot trying to fly to across that range). Figures for 'money supply' (currency + deposits) and 'high-powered money' (currency and bank reserves) thus represent praxis for the real monetary development in Germany; policy makers were concerned when they spoke of economic policy rather with currency in circulation than with a broader definition of the money supply, though some wanted to include giro accounts in estimates of the money supply. Columns C and ~1 thus repre sent ively a guide to how policy-makers acted and a guide to how the economy behaved respectively. It should be noted particularly in using these series that there is a non-comparability of the figures before and after March 1928 and that no attempt can be made to draw a continuous line through the results either side of this divide. The money-supply has been deflated according to the index of wholesale prices of the Statistisches Jahrbuch in the final column. 
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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Germany
